TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/100890/1008010.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 3.6 KB | 79 lines

                                                                                THE GULF, Page 39

THE POLITICAL INTEREST

The Case Against Nukes


By Michael Kramer


    War by Christmas and perhaps much sooner. That is the
latest estimate from Washington and abroad. Whether the
economic embargo could ever force Saddam Hussein to retreat from
Kuwait may never be known. "Our worst-case scenario," says an
Arab diplomat involved in the allies' deliberations, has Saddam
acceding to Bush's public demands. But the alliance's true
objective has moved berestoring the status quo ante to the
destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological warfare
capacities, a goal almost no one believes can be achieved
through negotiation. Hence "the logic of war," to borrow
Francois Mitterrand's phrase.

    The policy now being debated in Washington seeks to
maximize international support for war while minimizing the loss
of allied life. Some believe maintaining multinational
solidarity requires an ultimatum to Saddam: Cave in by such and
such a date, or we come at you with everything we've got. Sounds
good, but . . . "The problem with a clear warning," says
Michael Mandelbaum, a Johns Hopkins University foreign policy
professor, "is that it could cause Iraq to strike
pre-emptively, and pre-emption is a card we may want to play
ourselves. For Saddam this is World War III. He wins or he dies.
If he thinks it's coming, why wouldn't he shoot first? If we
could go first, it would lessen our losses on the ground and
cause the least disruption to the world economy. If an ultimatum
results in Saddam getting the jump, the chances of his crippling
the region's oil production increases greatly."

    Without the luxury of a further provocation from Iraq -- an
invasion of Saudi Arabia, the killing of Western hostages or
some other horror -- it may fall to the Kuwaiti Emir to request
that the United Nations act militarily. The collective-security
provisions embodied in the U.N. Charter's Article 51 could
provide the legal fig leaf for an internationally sanctioned war
against Iraq while preserving at least some element of tactical
surprise.

    Assuming a "go," the war will be fought massively, but
conventionally -- unless Saddam launches a chemical attack and
threatens Saudi Arabia's survival. "If our calculations prove
wrong and half of Riyadh is destroyed," says an Arab official
privy to the war gaming now under way, "then I wouldn't be
surprised if tactical nuclear weapons were used, and I don't
think many would resist their use."

    The case against nukes, however, is strong. Besides the
taboo that has existed since Nagasaki, and the problem of
precedent ("The temptation for other countries to use nukes
would increase if we use them in the gulf," says a Pentagon
official), there is the post-crisis environment to consider. No
matter the reason, an American atomic strike in the gulf would
signal that, unique among the world's present hot spots, the
Middle East is the region where the West views life as so cheap
that any weapon of war is justified. The problems of repair --
physical, psychological and political -- and the desire to
fashion a more stable regional order once Saddam was defeated
would be significantly magnified.

    A Bush adviser who countenances tactical nuclear weapons as
easily as the Arab official -- if only to forestall an imminent
Iraqi victory -- says their use has yet to be discussed
seriously because "everyone is confident" that a war against
Iraq will resemble a turkey shoot. He had better be right.